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ABSTRACT
In current Internet communication world, validity of source 
IP packet is and important issue. The problems of IP spoofing  
alarm the legitimate user of the Internet. This paper review 
recent progress of spoofing defenses by various researchers.  
Techniques and mechanisms proposed are being categorized 
to  better  illustrate  the deployment  and functionality  of  the 
mechanism. Overall, this paper summarizes the current anti  
spoofing mechanism in the Internet.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The  basic  protocol  for  the  Internet  communication  is 
Internet  Protocol  (IP).  Each  IP packet  has  its  own header 
with  necessary  felds  that  indicate  the  source  and  the 
destination of the packet (Postel, 1981). These felds are pre-
format by the operating system before the packet is sent. If 
the source address of the packet header is forged, the packet 
will be seen as it was sent from other source. Forgery of IP 
packet  is called IP spoofng.  This hijacking technique used 
by attacker to mask their identity. IP spoofng is usually used 
on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS),  sending of spam 
and phishing mails attack. 
IP  spoofng  had  been  a  problem  without  easy  solution. 
Attacks such as DDoS and TCP SYN flood base on spoofed 
IP had  clogged the  network.  Phishing  emails  cost  victims 
loses  of  money  and  phisher  is  left  untraceable.  These 
problems are urge to be solved. There are several ways for 
spoofng defense. We can categorize these mechanisms base 
on  spoofng  prevention  before  the  transmission,  spoofng 
detection during transmission and spoofng detection after it 
reach the destination.
2.0 Review of Spoong Prevention Before 
Transmission
In  Network  Ingress  Filtering  (Ferguson  &  Senie,  2000), 
authors proposed that, the traffic is forwarded if the source 
IP of the traffic is belongs to the network. Ingress Filtering 
will  need  a  long  period  of  time  to  be  deployed  on  the 
Internet.  Ingress  Filtering  prevents  specific  network  from 
being used as victim of forged network address, however it 
did not address the problem of sending spoofed packet out to 
the network. Ingress Filtering will require every node within 
a  network  to  deploy  it,  before  it  can  work.  Furthermore, 
routers  will  require  additional  configurations  and  filtering 
overhead.
3.0 Review of Spoofing Detection During 
Transmission
Route-based filtering (RBF) further extend network ingress 
filtering by filtering packet base on network topology.  RBF 
autonomously harvest  data traffic of suspicious source and 
update  when  there  changes  in  route  or  routing  table 
(Mirkovic,  Jevtiv  &  Reiher,  2006).  Author's  work  was 
separated into 2 parts: populating incoming table entries and 
updating  them  when  routing  changes  occur,  and  filtering 
spoofed packet using incoming table information and ingress 
filtering. Author design Clouseau system to handle the first 
part  and  RBF  handle  the  second  part.  Clouseau  system 
randomly  drop  TCP  data  packet  that  arrive  at  router  and 
observe subsequence retransmission from the same source. 
RBF at the same time filter spoofed packets by comparing 
packet's incoming interface with expected interface. 
Consider  two router,  A and  B connected  to  router  P,  and 
router P connected to router R through interface 2. Router R 
holds routing information of all incoming traffic that enters 
R. Traffic that comes from A, P and B will appear from the 
same interface  2. Author stated that  if  P and  R both were 
filters then spoofing will be able to be detected.
RBF  will  works  well  for  smaller  network,  but  for  the 
complexity of current architecture of the Internet, RBF will 
not scale. It will also be a problem for RBF to detect spoofed 
packet for a multihomed network and autonomous systems 
(AS).  If  the  spoofed  packet  is  sent  and  route  from  one 
network  through  another  network,  the  packet  will  be 
detected as it come from another interface.
In Spoofing Prevention Method (SPM), router that is closer 
to the destination of a packet verifies the authenticity of the 
source address of the packet (Bremler-Barr & Levy, 2005). 
Routers mark and check outgoing packet with labels related 
to  destination.  An  encrypted  unique  temporal  key  is 
associated with each ordered pair of source and destination 
network. The key is known in advance by both parties, and 
used  as  lightweight  authentication  mechanism  to 
authenticate  source  address of incoming packets.  Keys are 
placed when the packet is sent out from the router and being 
removed  after  the  key  of  the  packet  is  authenticated  (at 
incoming router).  When ISP detects attack on its network, 
they protect themselves by allowing only packets that come 
from SPM member network to ensure clean traffics. 
The  key  player  of  SPM  is  the  encrypted  key  placed  on 
packets. In the paper, author suggested to place the key on 
packet's IP header; in IP option field or ID field. Author also 
suggested placing tagging task at edge routers at the ISP. 
SPM has major advantage over RBF that SPM is an end-to-
end protocol and require lower deployment cost, while RBF 
can only work (efficiently) if all ASes implement RBF. But 
SPM  will  only  work  if  the  source  and  destination  of  the 
(spoofed) packet is SPM router. Spoofing detection will not 
work if either side is not SPM router.
In  Distributed Packet Filtering (Park & Lee, 2001) authors 
show that they can limit IP spoofing based on global routing 
information. Route based Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF) 
is placed on routers at vertex cover of AS network.  Every 
router maintains a route and filtering table. Assume a packet 
is  to  be  send  from  source  S to  destination  D.  When  the 
packet enters the router of network from S, a set of feasible 
routes  is being  computed.  Base  on the routing  policy,  the 
best path is being chosen. In DPF, the shortest path is being 
implemented into the policy. The path from S to D is being 
maintained in router's route table. The incoming interface of 
the  packet  enters  is  checked  when the  packet  arrived,  by 
looking  up  into  the  routing  table.  If  packet  arrived  from 
unexpected interface, the packet will be dropped. 
Route based DPF is able to trace attacker's source AS with 
only one spoofed packet  arrived at the victim.  For tracing 
back attacker's location, route based DPF is able to minimize 
the  possible  attacker's  origin  network  up  to  a  very  small 
range of network. Park's work shows that they can limit IP 
spoofing but it has some implementation issue; the scope of 
the work is too big. It is impossible to get all ISP around to 
world  for  it.  Updating  and  maintaining  the  routing  table 
(precisely) will also be a problem.
Duan,  Yuan  and  Chandrashekar (2008)  proposed  an 
interdomain  packet  filter  (IDPF)  architecture  based  on  on 
locally exchanged Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates 
only (p.22 ), as extension of DPF (Park & Lee, 2001). BGP 
works  base  on trust  between  ASes  (Rekther,  Li  & Hares, 
2006). BGP routers will update their routing table when they 
receive update message from neighbor node. In the process 
of  deciding  transmission route  in BGP,  when node  u (AS 
router) receives an incoming packet forwarding request from 
neighbor  node  W,  u will  examine  the  destination  of  the 
packet.  u will then import feasible routes to the destination 
from neighbor node. From all feasible routes, u will compute 
for candidate routes and choose the best route.  u will then 
export the best route to W.
Whenever a packet enters the Internet, the router will check 
for  the destination  of  the packet.  IDPF gets feasible  route 
from  source  node  to  the  destination  node  through  BGP 
transmission. Candidate routes and best route was chosen by 
IDPF base on their policies. In IDPF, AS nodes v will accept 
packet  if and only if the packet  come from neighbor node 
and that router is within the best route, otherwise the source 
address of the packet is spoofed. However, IDPF is not able 
to  filter  spoofed  IP packet  that  is  sent  within the  path  of 
ASes  the  packet  traverse.  Spoofed  packet  will  still  be 
forwarded as any legitimate packet. Furthermore, IDPF only 
learn feasible routes, not the actual route the packet traverse. 
Filtering  of  IP  Spoofed  Packets  near  the  attacker  (FSN) 
detects  attacks  based  on  information  collected  through 
Interior  Gateway Protocol  (Ohtsuka,  Nakamura,  Sekiya,  & 
Wakahara, 2007) Outgoing packet at FSN router is marked 
with  its  own  signature  before  forward  to  the  next  router. 
Neighbor  Link  Table  (NLT)  is  constructed  from topology 
information  of  link-state  routing  protocol.  NLT  contains 
information about source network, previous FSN router and 
router  interface.  Spoofed packet  detection is performed by 
querying  packet  signature  from  NLT.  Author  proposed 
another  approach  with  the  same  method  under  Open 
Shortest Path First (OSPF).
Source  Address  Validation Enforcement  (SAVE) is a new 
protocol proposed to provide information needed to validate 
source  address  of  incoming  packet  (Li  et  al,  2009).  Each 
router that the packet traverse build correct incoming table 
with  incoming  interface.  With  this  incoming  table,  each 
router  can  verify  the  packet  and  filter  packets  with 
mismatching source address. 
SAVE provides end-to-end anti spoofing mechanism. Each 
router sends updates to neighbor router from time to time to 
update  each  other's  incoming  table  like  BGP and  Routing 
Information Protocol  (RIP).  SAVE update records the path 
the update had traversed and assure that the update message 
traverse through the correct path. RBF limits the range of IP 
addresses for possible spoofing attacks but spoofing attack is 
still  possible.  IDPF  and  SAVE  further  improved  RBF  by 
forwarding  packet  only  if  they  came  from  the  correct 
interface. 
Packet forwarding with source verification was proposed to 
address  spoofing  prevention  via  two  approaches  (Shue, 
Gupta  &  Davy,  2008).  In  the  first  approach,  definitive 
packet  tagging, routers tag packet  that originate from their 
domain. Along the path that the packets traverse, the tag of 
packet will be verified. Once verified, the valid packet will 
be re-tag with the tag of  the forwarding  router.  This hop-
wise  tagging  process  will  keep  the  number  of  tag  each 
implementing  router  has.  Packet  that  is  lack  of  tag  or 
incorrectly  tagged  is  dropped.  The  second  approach, 
deductive  packet  tagging,  implementing  routers  can verify 
and tag packet  from nearby domain.  Implementing  routers 
involved in TCP handshake process from random routers to 
verify the tags.  
Similar  to source  verification method,  BGP Anti-Spoofing 
Extension (BASE) combines the mechanism of DPF (Park 
&  Lee,  2001)  and  Path  Identifier  (Yaar,  Perrig  &  Song, 
2003).  BASE  filter  packets  base  on  their  path  tag  (Lee, 
Kwon, Hasker & Perrig, 2007). Packet is tagged by a hashed 
marking  value  of  their  BGP path  that  is  distributed  using 
BGP updates.  Every packet  from the same source  address 
will have the same tag regarding the path they traverse and 
interface they arrive from.. When a packet arrived at BASE 
deployed  router,  the  router  will  tag  outgoing  packets  and 
drop incoming packet without proper tag.
Unicast  Reverse  Path  Forwarding  (uRPF)  require  that  the 
traffic  is  forwarded  only  if  the  traffic  arrive  at  the  same 
interface as the one that is used by the router to reach the 
source  in  forwarding  table  (Cisco  Systems,  2005;  Cisco 
Systems,  2007).  Although  the  mechanism  is  simple,  the 
effectiveness of uRPF is limited.  With current  architecture 
of the Internet, a lot of multihomed network have different 
interface  for  incoming  and  outgoing  traffic.  Traffic  might 
traverse different path and uRPF require extra lookup at the 
router's  forwarding  table for  each packet  that  arrive at the 
router.  The  efficiency  of  RPF  depends  on  BGP  routing 
information.  RPF will drop valid packet  if the router does 
not receive routing information BGP updates for the source 
prefix.   
In  Spoofing Prevention based on Hierarchical Coordination 
Model  (SP-HCM),  each  ordered  pair  of  source  and 
destination network have a unique temporary signature (Lv 
&  Sun,  2007).  Similar  to  SPM  (Bremler-Barr  &  Levy, 
2005),  routers  in  ASes  mark  outgoing  packet  with  the 
signature.  Upon  arrival  of  packet  at  border  router,  the 
signature is being examined and verifies the authenticity of 
its source address. Source address information is transmitted 
by Hierarchical Coordination Model (HCM) using dynamic 
bloom  filter.  In  SP-HCM,  node  of  AS  have  sensor  that 
continuously  perform  tasks  by  querying  routers' 
Management  Information  Base  (MIB)  through  Simple 
Network  Management  Protocol  (SNMP)  to  gather 
information  about  managed  entities.  Actuator  at  border 
routers will poll for information from sensor and process it. 
Network  address  space  signature  is  exchanged  this  way. 
Similar problem as SPM appears. SP-HCM will only work if 
all ASes deploy SP-HCM mechanism.
4.0 Review of Spoofing Detection at Destination
Wang,  Jin  and  Shin  (2007) proposed  defense  against 
spoofed traffic base on the value of Time To Live (TTL) on 
packet and compute the total  hop the packet  traveled from 
the source (attacker) to destination (p. 40). This value is very 
accurate as the value of TTL on a packet is not forgeable by 
attacker.  TTL field of  an IP header  specify the maximum 
lifetime of an IP packet. Routers perform decrement by 1 on 
TTL when forwarding the packet to the next router. When a 
packet  arrives  at  destination,  TTL  is  subtracted  with  the 
initial value of TTL to get the total number of hop the packet 
traverse.  Author  built  Hop  Count  Filtering  (HCF)  at  end 
host, an accurate IP to hop-count (IP2HC) map by grouping 
IP prefixes based on hop count. In this case, TTL place the 
same role as temporal  key in SPM, to authenticate packets 
that arrived at destination. 
The  effectiveness  of  HCF lies on the hop-count  values of 
packet.  HCF cannot  detect  spoofed  and  legitimate  packets 
with  same  hop-count.  Base  on  author's  work,  author 
suggests that spoofed IP packets have mismatch IP address 
and hop-count (base on IP2HC). By performing a lookup in 
IP2HC map HCF is able to drop spoofed traffics.  HCF is 
believed to work well as attacker  is not  able to falsify the 
value of TTL, but intermediate attackers will be able to try 
to  launch  attack  from  location  with  matching  hop-count 
values.     
HCF  causes  delays  to  transmission.  To  overcome  this 
problem, HCF operates under alert mode to detect spoofed 
traffic and action mode to drop packets when spoofed traffic 
is detected. Action mode will perform per-packet hop-count 
computation  and  compare  with  values  in  IP2HC.  HCF is 
deployed  at  end  host,  hence  easier  to  deploy  compare  to 
RBF. 
Path Identifier (Pi) proposed a packet marking algorithm to 
mark each packet  that  traverse  through Pi  enabled routers 
onto the packet's  header  in IP Identification field (Yaar et 
al.,  2003).  The  IP  Identification  field  is  broken  into  16/n 
sections.  When ever  a  packet  enter  Pi  enabled  router,  the 
router  compute  the  value of  current  packet's  TTL modulo 
16/n and  insert  into  the  IP  Identification  field  before  the 
packet is being forwarded. 
Pi  act  as a fingerprint  of  the packet.  Packets  traveling the 
same  path  will  have  the  same  Pi  value.  Since  it's  a  per-
packet  marking mechanism,  victim will be able to defense 
himself from DDoS attack by filtering packets that carry the 
same  Pi  as  attacker's  packet.  Pi  works  well  under  the 
network  where  all  routers  deploy  Pi  marking  scheme. 
Unfortunately,  it is rather impossible to have all routers in 
ASes  from  different  ISP  to  deploy  Pi.  Furthermore, 
performance of Pi degrades when there are non-Pi enabled 
routers  in  between  the  path.  These  legacy  routers  will 
forward  packets  without  marking  them.  Also  the  authors 
identified  the  problem  of  Pi  where  TTL  is  vulnerable  to 
attacks. 
StackPi  by  Yaar,  Perrig,  and  Song  (2006)  improved  Pi's 
performance  by  proposing  two  new  marking  schemes  – 
Stack-based  marking  and  Write-ahead  marking  (p.  1853). 
StackPi  treat  IP  Identification  field  as  a  stack.  When  a 
packet  enters  a StackPi  router,  it  left shift  the value of  IP 
Identification  field  for  n bits  and  mark  (push)  its  own 
marking bit into the stack. For packets that arrived on legacy 
router, the packet will have no interaction with the marking 
and forwarded.  For routers that  have the IP address of the 
next-hop, the router computes the marking bit for the next 
router  and  push  into  stack.  This  Write-ahead  marking 
increase the performance of StackPi against legacy routers. 
StackPi's mechanism also increase the performance of HCF 
is being implemented together. 
Gao and  Ansari  (2007) enhanced  Pi's  idea and  introduced 
AS-based  Edge  Marking  (ASEM)  to  marks  packet  at  AS 
level (p. 732). ASEM only marks incoming packet on edge 
routers.  All  incoming packet  is being  marked with its  AS 
number  (ASN)  of  the  edge  router  it  enter.  AS  path  is 
claimed  to  be  shorter  than  IP  path,  hence  address  the 
problem of Pi. Pi limits the number of Pi mark to be store in 
IPv4 header to 16 bits, while the estimated size of Internet 
will require 28 bits to store Pi for end to end host. AS level 
marking is also more stable compare to IP level marking.
Chen,  Park  and  Marchany  (2007)  proposed  Attack 
Diagnosis (AD), which applies divide and conquer strategy 
in tracing  packet  source  (p.  577).  AD is divided into two 
paradigms.  Attack detection on near victim's host  is being 
performed.  Once attack is detected,  it will notify upstream 
routers to start marking incoming packets with interface port 
identifier  (PID)  for  traceback.  Based  on  the  marking  of 
packet,  victim separate  attacker's  traffic from other client's 
traffic and notify upstream router to filter packets. AD have 
lower  processing  overhead  compare  to  other  proposed 
method as routers mark packet only after attack is detected. 
This is also the down side of AD as attack reached end-host, 
damage is occurred.
The above discussion is summarized as table 1.
5.0 Conclusion
This  paper  had  reviewed  different  type  spoofing  defense 
mechanism  proposed  by  various  researchers.  This  studies 
shown that most researchers try to deploy spoofing defense 
during packet transmission, as a credit to customer and the 
ISP  that  implement  it.  Network  Ingress  Filtering  works 
effectively  but  it  only  prevent  its  own  network  from 
spoofing, rather than protection its own network from being 
spoofed.  On  the  other  side,  spoofing  defense  at  the 
destination  might  introduce  new problems  other  than  anti 
spoofing.
Table 1: Evaluation Parameter and Test Data for different method.
Author Method Evaluation Parameter Test Data
Park & 
Lee, 
2001
DPF Proactive & Reactive filtering 
on loose and tight mode
RouteViews 
Project
Yaar et 
al., 2003
Pi No. of bits per router mark
No.  of  hops  away  from  the 
victim
Burch  & 
Cheswick 
Internet 
Mapping 
Project
Bremler-
Barr & 
Levy, 
2005
SPM Attack rate under no defense
Attack  rate  under  different 
filtering combination
Fixedorbit, IP 
address 
statistic
Yaar et 
al., 2006
StackPi user acceptance ratio
attacker acceptance ratio
Burch  and 
Cheswick’s 
Internet 
Mapping 
Project
Mirkovic 
et al., 
2006
RBF No.  of  source  and  unfiltered 
spoofed addresses for a given 
target destination
No.  of  source  and  spoofing 
target  for  a  given  unfiltered 
spoofed address
Spoofability  of  unfiltered 
spoofed addresses for a given 
source and target destination
RouteViews 
Project
Ohtsuka 
et al., 
2007
FSN Successful IP Spoofed Packet 
Detection Rate
Network 
Topology 
from BRITE
Gao & 
Ansari, 
2007
ASEM The  number  of  packets 
required  for  path 
reconstruction
Skitter 
project  of 
CAIDA  & 
the  Internet 
Mapping data 
from Lumeta
Chen et 
al., 2007
AD false positive ratio
Number of throttled attackers 
over time
Skitter 
project  of 
CAIDA  & 
the  Internet 
Mapping data 
from Lumeta
Lee et 
al., 2007
BASE Dropping  ratio  of  attack 
packets
Dropping  ratio  of  legitimate 
packets
RouteViews 
Project
Lv & 
Sun, 
2007
SP-
HCM
Storage  cost  comparison  for 
multiple-domain topologies
Transit-stub 
graph  from 
GT-ITM
Wang et 
al., 2007
HCF Filtering Accuracy
Percentage  of  saved  CPU 
cycle
DDos 
Testbed
Shue et 
al., 2008
Packet 
forward
ing 
with 
source 
verifica
tion
Percentage  of  networks  that 
are able to spoof
Percentage  of  networks  that 
can steal a tag
Percentage  of  networks  that 
can abuse a tag
Transit-stub 
graph  from 
GT-ITM
Duan et 
al., 2008
IDPF Victim Fraction
Attack Fraction
Victim Trace Fraction
RouteViews 
Project
Li et al., 
2009
SAVE SAVE Effectiveness
Storage  cost  comparison  for 
multiple-domain topologies
Bandwidth ratio
Transit-stub 
graph  from 
GT-ITM
Deploying  spoofing  defense  during  transmission  seems 
promising  with  acceptable  overhead  and  deployment  cost, 
but  there's  an  obstacle  ahead  –  The  Internet  itself.  The 
architecture of the Internet is consists of thousands of ASes. 
Each  AS  contains  collection  of  connected  IP  routing 
prefixes  under  the  control  of  routers  of  Internet  Service 
Provider  (ISP)  with defined routing policy to the Internet. 
ASes of the Internet communicate with each other, maintain 
reachability  and  route  traffics  via  various  type  of  routing 
protocol.
Routing protocol keeps on evolving. With different routing 
algorithm and techniques,  it is hard to implement  a single 
spoofing  defense  mechanism  that  works  with  everyone. 
With IP multicast routing, mobility network and multihomed 
network, it further complicate the effort to deploy spoofing 
defenses effectively. 
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